The postmodernist wants to reject the existence of brute facts by saying that all facts are interpreted by subjects who exist in a socio-cultural milieu. Therefore, we can never access “objective” truth because there are no brute facts. All our knowledge is colored by our socio-cultural situation. Van Til’s point in rejecting brute facts is not that human subjects are bound by culture and are therefore unable to interpret facts without bias, but that God is the all-knower. The self-sufficient Triune God knows all facts and pre-interprets them. Therefore we can never come to any fact without approaching it as one that is already known and has been interpreted by the all-knowing Triune God.

On page 101 of his book The Next Reformation: Why Evangelicals Must Embrace Postmodernity, Carl Raschke speaks of Van Til’s as a transitional theology on its way toward postmodernism. This is a terrible case of misreading a theologian – using a gross misrepresentation for one’s own doctrinal wiles. Our task as human knowers is to reinterpret the facts, thinking God’s thoughts after him on a created level. We think analogically as our knowledge is firmly planted on the one who knows all things. As such we are not hopelessly trapped within our socio-cultural context, but can escape that context because God has clearly revealed himself and that he is the reference point for all knowledge. Perhaps readers are interpreting Van Til according to their own postmodern inclinations.

One approach would simply be to define Christian philosophy as the Christian approach to traditional philosophic categories (i.e. metaphysics, epistemology and ethics). But this doesn’t seem to make a real distinction at all. Philosophy would be no more different from theology than, say, ecclesiology would be. Furthermore, the great theologians dealt with these topics. Why do we prefer to call them theologians rather than philosophers? This approach does not satisfy.

Others have suggested that theology is distinguished from philosophy in that theology requires exegesis. This seems to be a better attempt at a distinction. But we still speak of “speculative theologians.” I think the title reveals how we intuitively think about this issue. We still leave room [often pejoratively] under the category of “theologian” for those who venture into theological spheres without being rooted in exegesis.

Webster defines philosophy as “a search for a general understanding of values and reality by chiefly speculative rather than observational means.” This definition does not move us toward a distinction between philosophy and theology at all. Rather, it underscores the difficulty in making such a distinction. A Christian philosophy is neither “chiefly speculative” nor “observational.” Truly Christian philosophy is revelational. And since this is the case, what distinguishes it from theology?

Perhaps it would be wisest to think of Christian philosophy and Christian theology as highly overlapping disciplines that differ ever so slightly in subject matter. K. Scott Oliphint suggests we should be much more fluid in our understanding of the relationship between these two disciplines. Whenever engaging in philosophy, the Christian should never put aside his theological thinking. But there may also be differences in terms of method. This is an area for further research. How, specifically, does a presuppositionally consistent Christian engage in an explicitly philosophic endeavor? I’m not sure anyone has answered that question.

Modern scientists inherited this false ideal of knowledge from the Greeks. Parmenides saw the vision of reality as one, to which nothing had ever been or could ever be added. Kant followed his modern predecessors; the idealists followed Kant; the “logial atomists” and the “logical positivists” in turn follow the idealists. The “revolution in philosophy” which we have traced so far is a revolution within the Kantian revolution, within the Renaissance revolution, within the Greek revolution, within the revolution of Adam.

Cornelius Van Til, Christian Theistic Evidences . Also found in Bahnsen, Greg L. Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis , 372.

Supernatural verbal revelation is, according to Van Til, inherent in the human situation and the intended concomitant to supernatural revelation in nature and in man’s inner constitution. In that case, man was never – and is not now – expected simply to observe the natural world or consider his own rational, moral personality and figure out for himself how they are to be interpreted and how their truths are to be verbally expressed. Man’s Creator has provided the linguistic framework for “exegeting” the truth of God in natural revelation and in man himself.¹

When we step back and think about this, it is a fairly straightforward point. But what is interesting is the way he couches the statement. God has given us the linguistic framework for understanding natural revelation. What Bahnsen and Van Til are saying is starkling opposed to contemporary teaching in philosophy. Grenz and Franke in following Wittgenstein present a post-modern world where each community has its own linguistic framework and makes sense of reality through that grid. Jacques Derrida talks about subjects being locked in a hall of mirrors. We are always and everywhere trapped by our own experience and our own linguistic structure. How does one transcend this limitation?

Karl Rahner, probably the most influential Roman Catholic theologian of the 20th century and the mind behind the theology of Vatican II, speaks of thematic and unthematic knowledge. Thematic knowledge pertains to religion, science and other structured knowledge most often obtained through a syllogistic process. This knowledge is second order, however and takes a back seat to the first order knowledge he calls unthematic knowledge. This is the intuition each human has that he is dependent upon “being” most properly understood as God. Unthematic knowledge is known immediately without conceptual or linguistic mediation. Formally, we might say Rahner’s unthematic knowledge is general revelation. Man as image of God does have an immediate knowledge of the Creator that is not run through conceptual or linguistic frameworks. But in understanding that immediate knowledge is where Rahner and Van Til go in opposite directions.

Van Til incorporates the reformed doctrine of special revelation and places it as the exclusive interpreter of general revelation. So for Van Til, there is no natural theology, only natural (general) revelation which is interpreted by special revelation. Rahner, on the other hand, has an understanding that grace is available through the whole world and that all men will be “divinized” or reversely incarnated, as it were, if they have some sort of passionate, genuine experience. In that sense, unbelievers are “anonymous” Christians. I’ve heard that Rahner would have even been “honored” to have been called an “anonymous” Buddhist.

We must maintain the exclusivity of special revelation for interpreting general revelation. Through this special revelation we are able to transcend our linguistic limitations because God transcends them and He has revealed Himself to us. We “break through” because we everywhere and always rely on God, who is a se – the God who is comprehensive in His knowledge and inexhaustible in His thought.

¹Bahnsen, Greg L. Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1998), 195.

A student’s attitude toward a controversy may be said to be normal if it reveals an intelligent and diligent following of all points in dispute. A student wants to learn. He is filled with an insatiable desire for knowledge. To gain knowledge, in the broad sense of the term, is his exclusive aim. For the purpose of acquiring knowledge he goes to the class-room. For that purpose he reads, reads much. With that purpose in mind he views current events and tries to ascertain the principles that impel men to act. With that purpose in mind he is to view, chiefly, any and all controversies of whatever nature.

But now in actuality we find that ofttimes we are not normal, but abnormal students. We are either too cold or too hot. If the controversies that fill the very air about us with their din do not even reach our ears, if we seal ourselves hermetically within the circle prescribed by our text-books, we are too cold or too narrow. We either overemphasize the student virtue of concentration on our school work, so that it becomes a vice, or our pulsebeat is too slow, so that we need a tonic to restore our lost vitality.

In 1953, Cecil De Boer, the editor of Calvin Seminary’s Calvin Forum published a series of articles criticizing the “new apologetic” of Cornelius Van Til.¹ Jesse De Boer,² the sharpest of Van Til’s critics in these issues, wrote a three-part series published from August to November criticizing Van Til’s use of categories borrowed from idealist philosophy. De Boer³ felt it was impossible to borrow these categories without compromising Reformed orthodoxy. The collective response in the Calvin Forum, led by Jesse De Boer’s articles, has become infamous in Van Tilian circles. The character and tone, coupled with superficial critiques, have placed the August-September 1953 Calvin Forum as the forefather of a series of mischaracterizations of Van Til’s apologetic system.

I will begin by describing De Boer’s critique of Van Til’s use of one particular idealist: Bernard Bosanquet. I will then briefly examine De Boer’s critique and, given the superficial nature of his critique and the unusual tone taken in his writing, I will offer an historical explanation for the character of De Boer’s critique. I will argue that the particular forceful language from Jesse De Boer is motivated by three main factors. The first factor is animosity toward Van Til, Westminster Theological Seminary and the Orthodox Presbyterian Church that had been growing throughout the years for several various reasons. The second factor involves Van Til’s writing style, which was obscure at points. De Boer admittedly did not fully understand Van Til’s apologetic system. Finally, Jesse De Boer was not thoroughly familiar with all of Van Til’s writings on idealist philosophy at the time. These three factors contributed to the particular character and shape of De Boer’s articles which were eventually published in 1953.

De Boer on Van Til’s Use of Bosanquet⁴

De Boer had many issues with Van Til’s apologetic system, but his main concern was Van Til’s use of idealist categories in describing a Christian reformed apologetic.⁵ De Boer goes well beyond mere nomenclature when he demands that by using idealist categories, Van Til must espouse idealist philosophy. Part one of De Boer’s series, which was published in the August-September 1953 issue of the Calvin Forum, was bluntly titled “Part 1: A Linguistic Bramble Patch.” In it he charged that

Van Til’s use of this vague idealistic language, borrowed perhaps from the idealistic logicians whose works he studied years ago, ought to be disconcerting to a Reformed mind, in fact to any Christian.⁶

I want to point out specifically how he uses terms and arguments borrowed from speculative idealism, and thereby to underline my view that he is skating on thin ice; his purism is turning into a boomerang. For modern idealism is no friend of Christianity.⁷

I mean only to say that his language is idealistic, and that by choosing to use such language he chooses to make idealistic, non-Christian statements.⁸

De Boer’s criticisms did, however, move beyond the bare use of idealist terms. He argued that Van Til’s apologetic actually contained idealist elements. De Boer’s main problem with Van Til’s use of Bosanquet was his method of implication. Bosanquet presented an alternative to linear inference, which is a straight, progressive syllogistic method of reasoning. Bosanquet hypothesized that reasoning comes by way of judgments that place individual truths in relation to an entire system of truth. For Bosanquet, any single truth presupposes the entire system of truth. Therefore, one cannot approach reality by beginning with one single truth and progressively and linearly syllogizing toward a fuller understanding. Rather, reality is approached by judging, namely, placing every truth within the system of truth which his tradition called the absolute.

De Boer did not think this was acceptable.

My guess is that he considers idealist logic to be [a] handy weapon for the defense of his twisted and purist version of Reformed apologetics. Actually it is a boomerang.⁹

De Boer acknowledged that Van Til did not follow the idealist to his conclusions, but saw his use of Bosanquet’s logic as a gross inconsistency. De Boer argued that this idealist theory of knowledge resulted in pantheism. If all rational beings have true knowledge and no single human is omniscient, then the absolute system of truth is a summation of the knowledge possessed by each individual. Therefore, if one equates the idealist absolute with God, then every being with true knowledge would be a part of God. For De Boer, Van Til’s incorporation of idealist categories into his apologetic system meant the end of Reformed orthodoxy.

[more to come in future posts]

Footnotes

1. Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987) was Professor of Apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, PA from 1929 to his retirement in 1972. He continued to teach occasionally until 1979. For an excellent biography of Van Til, see John R. Muether, Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and Churchman (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2008).

2. Jesse De Boer (no relation to Cecil De Boer) was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kentucky in Lexington, Kentucky.

3. I will refer to Jesse De Boer (rather than Cecil De Boer) by his last name throughout these posts unless indicated otherwise. I will also occasionally use the abbreviation CVT to refer to Cornelius Van Til in footnotes.

4. Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) was a British absolute idealist following in the philosophical tradition of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Bosanquet was a colleague of Francis Herbert Bradley at Oxford. Van Til often referenced Bosanquet and F. H. Bradley particularly when discussing a Christian approach to logic. Bosanquet held to a view that any single truth presupposed or required a complete system of truth.

5. De Boer criticized Van Til’s use of military imagery in describing apologetics, the way in which Van Til described the unbeliever’s knowledge, and several other elements of Van Til’s theology De Boer thought were the result of the influences of idealist philosophy.

6. Jesse De Boer, “Professor Van Til’s Apologetics,” The Calvin Forum 19, nos. 1-2 (1953): 10.

7. Jesse De Boer, “Professor Van Til’s Apologetics,” The Calvin Forum 19, nos. 1-2 (1953): 11.

8. Jesse De Boer, “Professor Van Til’s Apologetics,” The Calvin Forum 19, nos. 1-2 (1953): 11.

9. Jesse De Boer, “Professor Van Til’s Apologetics,” The Calvin Forum 19, nos. 1-2 (1953): 11.

I suggest that Van Til’s apologetics, because it does not grow out of painstaking and complete mastery of great Christian texts, ancient, medieval, and modern, is twisted and victimized by the categories and techniques of the idealists whose works he read in his student days.

from The Brothers Karamazov, page 31 of the 2004 Barnes & Noble Classics edition.

The question of knowledge is an ethical question at the root. It is indeed possible to have theoretically correct knowledge about God without loving him. The devil illustrates this point. Yet what is meant by knowing God in Scripture is knowing and loving God: this is true knowledge of God: the other is false. (The Defense of the Faith, 4th ed., p. 38-39)*

Jonathan Edwards, commenting on knowledge, says the following:

Natural men may obtain a large notional knowledge and understanding of the doctrines of divinity. They may be very well versed in theology, and may have read an abundance of books which treat of divinity with much learning and great strength of reason. They may very much excel ordinary Christians in this, may have a very clear head, and may be able nicely to distinguish and to penetrate narrowly into the criticisms of divine theorems…

He may have such knowledge that he may be able to dispute very artfully and cunningly about theological matters, and he may be able to stop the mouths of his opponents…

Though he can talk as well and as rationally as most about the gloriousness of God, yet he loves him not half so well as some other things. And what is the reason? It must be because he does not discern this gloriousness of God, how well soever he can talk of it. It must be that there is a certain knowledge of God’s excellency he has not. Though he thinks he knows a great deal of divinity, yet some Christian, that he looks upon as ignorant in comparison of himself, has a great deal better apprehension of God’s loveliness than he; it is plain to a demonstration, because the Christian apprehends him better. (“A Spiritual Understanding Denied to the Unregenerate” in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 14, pp. 72-76)

It is important that we not misunderstand Edwards here. He is not knocking notional or speculative knowledge. He is simply distinguishing between speculative and spiritual understanding. One can have speculative knowledge without having spiritual understanding, but one cannot have a spiritual understanding without speculative knowledge. Edwards is essentially making the same distinction as Van Til.

*Dr. K. Scott Oliphint offers this very helpful comment on p. 39n31:

There is perhaps no greater controversy surrounding Van Til’s thought than the question of knowledge. These qualifications, then, become important in discussions of his epistemology and apologetic. Without doing justice to the entire debate, we should note the following:

(1) Van Til sees the question of knowledge as “an ethical question at root.” It is such because included in it is one’s relationship to God. It is not simply, therefore, that one can have true knowledge if one assents to a particular true proposition. The context of that assent is as important as the assent itself. This is an apologetic point that is often overlooked, especially in philosophical discussions of knowledge.

(2) Van Til does admit that it is possible, and he would even say that it is the case, that one can have theoretically correct knowledge about God, or anything else, without loving God. However, because “knowledge is an ethical question at the root” theoretical knowledge falls far short of what it means, biblically, to know God(and by implication, to know anything else).

(3) When Van Til says, “What is meant by knowing God in Scripture…,” he does not mean to say that the only way Scripture uses “knowledge of God” includes “knowing and loving” God. Van Til says in numerous places that unbelievers know God truly. He means to say only that knowledge in its fullest sense in Scripture includes loving God as well.

(4) The last clause, “the other [knowledge] is false,” is, admittedly, a confusing way to speak. False knowledge can be a difficult thing to grasp. However, if ones sees knowledge “as an ethical question at root,” then “false knowledge” would be knowledge that is theoretically correct-that is, it assents to a true proposition and ascribes the right properties to a given thing-but it is false in that the context for such is rebellion against God, who not only gives the knowledge but alone can provide for an accurate account of it.

This explanation, I believe, brings Van Til and Edwards closer together.